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Abstract 
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union (EU) required 
long-term negotiations between two major polities of the industrialized world. During the negotiations, Canada acqui-
esced to the EU’s demand that Canadian provinces participate directly in discussions, setting an important precedent in 
the dynamics of Canadian external trade. This paper examines the dynamics of intergovernmentalism in the policy area 
of external trade within the settings of the Canadian provinces and the EU member states, and uses the findings to sug-
gest that in this realm the EU is a stronger example of federal synthesis of decision-making than is Canada. This is 
significant because it contradicts many established theories of federalism within political science, and implies that the 
EU could become a strong source of normative example for federal-style polities in the globalized world. As well, the 
strength of the EU’s single market lends credence to the institutions embedded within the supranational polity, and 
gives the EU significant normative power as a prototype for other experiments in regional integration. 
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1. Introduction 
Regional integration, whether in the form of free trade 
agreements or political alliances, is increasingly becom-
ing a tool used by countries and markets to respond to 
the challenges of globalization. The Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) brokered be-
tween Canada and the European Union (EU) and 
tentatively finalized, represents the largest free trade 
agreement in the wealthy industrialized world to date. 
‘Largest’, in this sense, refers to the sizes of the com-
bined Canadian market and EU Single Market, as well 
as the scope of the areas under agreement. The esti-
mated value of combined international trade is 
approximately 61.6 billion (European Commission, 
2013); in addition, the agreement targets the removal 
of non-tariff barriers (i.e., special licensing, regulatory 
regimes, and anti-dumping measures) rather than con-
ventional trade barriers (i.e., customs tariffs, quotas), 
many of which were already significantly low between 
Canada and the EU.1 Discussions on closer economic 
partnership began at the 2007 EU-Canada Summit in 
Berlin, where leaders agreed to complete a joint study. 
After publication of the joint study in 2008, leaders 
agreed to pursue negotiations toward a comprehensive 
                                                          
1 As stated in House of Commons (2011), which mentions that 
“the average tariffs imposed by Canada and the EU on imports 
were already very low and that there were very few traditional 
trade barriers between Canada and the EU.” This is heightened 
when assessing tariffs in a comparative context: Canada and 
the EU, among other developed countries, demonstrated 
increasingly low tariff barriers following the WTO Doha Round 
(World Trade Organization, International Trade Centre, & 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2015). 
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economic agreement. As of October 2013, Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper and European Commis-
sion President José Manuel Barroso agreed in principle 
to the resulting package of CETA negotiations (Gov-
ernment of Canada, 2013).2 Prior to CETA, both Canada 
and the EU have each successfully negotiated other 
free trade agreements with other significant economic 
areas (most notably, Canada within NAFTA, and the 
EU’s agreement with South Korea). However, the scope 
of CETA’s provisions for non-trade barriers—including, 
but not limited to, services, investment, and public 
procurement—and the political and economic impacts 
of trans-Atlantic free trade are thus far unparalleled.3 
Due to the size, scope, and political precedence of 
CETA, an examination of how the two sides reached 
the agreement to date is worthwhile for understanding 
the negotiation dynamics between two wealthy—and 
decentralized—entities. Comparing the interaction be-
tween the provinces and the federal government in 
Canada with the interaction between the EU Commis-
sion and the member states of the EU, holds the 
potential to offer substantive implications on the EU’s 
ability to set norms related to intergovernmental dy-
namics, as well as implications for the study of 
federalism and federal types of governance. In particu-
lar, many federalist scholars assert that Canada 
provides a solid prototype of a federal nation with di-
vided powers between central and regional 
governments, while the EU remains a supranational 
experiment that mimics some federal-like processes of 
governance but ultimately remains a collection of dis-
tinct nation-states sharing a confined realm of shared 
economic (and, to some extent, political) decision-
making (see, for example, Moravscik, 2007). Other 
scholars argue that while the conventional national 
form of federation is absent from the EU, the overarch-
ing application of shared authority between the EU 
institutions and member states in different policy areas 
is indeed applicable toward categorizing the EU within 
a comparative framework of federal-style polities (ex-
amples include Burgess, 2012; Elazar, 1995; Hueglin, 
2013). This is justified not only by detailed study of EU 
governance, but also with the consideration that all 
federations have significant differences from each oth-
er, and yet all still offer import into the central idea of 
harmony in shared rule between different regions. Be-
yond the categorization of federalisms, the negotiation 
dynamics that unfolded during the build-up to CETA’s 
finalization suggest that the EU is not just a strong 
                                                          
2 As of December 2015, the CETA agreement is finalized “in 
principle”. This means that translation into all EU languages still 
needs to take place, as well as ratification among all EU 
member states and Canadian actors. 
3 At the time of writing, a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) is in the early stages of discussion between 
the EU and the U.S. 
market, but is also a strong normative default example 
for how other markets—regional or national—might 
choose to govern themselves during international ne-
gotiations. 
The process of CETA in Canada received a great deal 
of coverage by municipal governments, news sources 
and business groups—perhaps logically, as the EU is 
Canada’s 2nd large trading partner and represents Can-
ada’s second most important source of foreign direct 
investment. The EU represents 9.5% of Canada’s total 
external trade (Government of Canada, 2013). At vari-
ous points during CETA negotiations, provincial 
authorities and municipal governments levelled criti-
cism at the federal government in Ottawa for 
conducting the negotiations with a lack of transparency 
and consultation. Provincial actors demanded more in-
clusion during negotiation as individual entities who 
sought to calculate their respective gains and losses in 
a potential free trade agreement with such a large and 
competitive market. By contrast, within the EU, there 
was relatively minimal coverage of CETA in Brussels 
and within most member states (with some important 
exceptions, outlined below). Economics alone can ex-
plain this in part: Canada is the EU’s 12th trading 
partner, representing 1.8% of the EU’s total external 
trade (European Commission, 2013). This asymmetry of 
trade balance between the two entities offers one intu-
itive explanation for the differential level of interest; 
simply put, as the EU had more leverage through which 
to conduct negotiations, there was arguably less prov-
ocation of insecurity, or even interest, among EU 
member states. This paper argues, however, that eco-
nomics and leverage alone do not account for a full 
explanation of why internal negotiating dynamics in 
Canada were more contentious than within the EU. In-
stead, this paper argues that the delineation of 
competences within the EU with regard to internation-
al trade made for a more streamlined process, in 
contrast to the Canadian form of provincial-federal in-
volvement in negotiations. The EU member states are 
not involved directly in the negotiations because they 
have authorized the European Commission to negoti-
ate on their behalf, whereas the Canadian provinces 
and territories played a more proactive role than do 
the EU member states in the ongoing negotiations to-
ward a CETA (House of Commons, 2011). This 
difference has two implications: first, institutional dif-
ferences matter, in that the organization of delegation 
and responsibility had potentially more impact on re-
sulting agreements than the idea of difference 
between a province and a country; second, the area of 
international trade competency offers a direct contrast 
to the intuitive hypothesis of which political entity be-
haves more like a federation. The EU—which is not a 
single country and remains comprised of very distinct 
European countries—has more integration between 
regional and central levels with regard to trade negoti-
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ations than does Canada, which instead provides an ex-
ample of sharper debates between the provincial and 
federal levels. The changes to provincial involvement in 
Canada during CETA negotiations point to the ability of 
the EU to export norms of intergovernmentalism. 
The next section of the paper provides a brief over-
view of the CETA agreement from its inception, as well 
as a brief overview of the main tenants of federal theo-
ries. This is followed by a summary of internal 
negotiation dynamics within Canada and the EU, re-
spectively. The summary includes a description of how 
federal-provincial processes operate within Canada 
with respect to external trade, as well as how the EU 
Commission interacts with EU member states in devel-
oping external free trade agreements. Following this is 
a comparative analysis of how each governing entity 
accommodates regional interests, attending to an 
overarching conception of federalism and central-
regional dynamics. The conclusion summarizes the 
main findings and offers implications for future re-
search in comparative federalism between Canada and 
the EU, and for the ability of the EU to export its own 
institutional norms. 
2. The Evolution of the Canada–EU Agreement 
Prior to the current agreement ‘in principle’, the histo-
ry of Canada–EU/EC trade relations dates back to the 
1976 Framework Agreement for Commercial and Eco-
nomic Cooperation. This was essentially an institutional 
framework for cooperation in trade and regulatory 
harmonization, and marked the first large-scale agree-
ment for the EU with an industrialized country. In 1998 
the two entities established a customs cooperation 
agreement, a veterinary agreement, and a number of 
sectoral mutual recognition agreements. All of these 
developments paralleled separate developments the 
EU had concurrently reached with the U.S. (Woolcock, 
2011, p. 27). 
In 2004, discussions began on the idea of a larger 
bilateral agreement that would bring in a much larger 
degree of market access in areas still subject to regula-
tory barriers, such as (but not limited to) financial 
services, intellectual property rights issues, and public 
procurement. The EU stalled this effort—then called 
the Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement 
(TIEA)—in 2006 after three rounds of negotiations 
failed to reach an agreement. The main reasons given 
for the stalled TIEA were the desire to wait for a suc-
cessful result at the Doha Round of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in the hopes that WTO negotia-
tions would clarify some of the issues that had arisen 
over the course of TIEA discussions (Gauthier & Hold-
en, 2011, p. 4), and the EU’s stated desire to have the 
Canadian provinces included in any agreement as a de-
vice of pre-commitment: “As EU liberalizing measures 
reach down below regional/provincial level and into 
the local level within the EU, the Commission sought 
broad reciprocity that the Canadian federal govern-
ment could not deliver” (Woolcock, 2011, p. 27). 
In 2007, the Quebec Premier Jean Charest, along 
with key EU leaders, pushed for re-opening discussions 
on stronger economic and political ties (Hübner, 2011, 
p. 3). The Government of Canada and the European 
Commission published a joint report in 2008, “As-
sessing the costs and benefits of a closer EU-Canada 
partnership”. The purpose of the report was to exam-
ine the existing tariff and non-tariff barriers between 
the two blocs in order to assess the effects of removing 
or heavily reducing such barriers. The more conten-
tious non-tariff barriers included labour mobility, 
government procurement, intellectual property rights, 
telecommunications and electronic commerce, along 
with regulatory cooperation in a number of other are-
as. The study also identified how deeper partnership 
could enhance bilateral cooperation in areas such as 
science and technology, energy, and the environment 
(European Commission & Government of Canada, 
2008, pp. ii-iii). Some of the key findings of the study 
predicted long-term macro-economic increases in real 
GDP of 0.02–0.03% for the EU and 0.18–0.36% for Can-
ada, with potentially higher figures when factoring in 
investment gains. At the sectoral level, the study pre-
dicted the greatest gains in output and trade to be 
stimulated by services liberalization and by the remov-
al of tariffs applied on sensitive agricultural products 
(European Commission & Government of Canada, 
2008, pp. 167-171). 
Formal negotiations began in May 2009 and con-
cluded in October 2013. The global financial crisis 
provided a backdrop impetus during this time period: 
for the EU, gains in trade from reduced barriers would 
provide revenue; for Canada, the need to diversify 
economics away from disproportionate dependence on 
the U.S. market became paramount. Major issues dur-
ing the course of negotiations included (but were not 
limited to) beef and pork, cheese and dairy, public pro-
curement procedures, pharmaceutical drugs, and 
copyright provisions.4 Prime Minister Harper and EU 
President Barroso stated in 2013 that the deal would 
likely be in place by 2015, after the text had been 
translated into all 24 languages of the EU and had been 
ratified by EU member states as well as Canada’s prov-
inces and territories (Waldie, 2013). News sources and 
public announcements concerning the deal ‘in principle’ 
hailed the CETA as a historic agreement for the depth of 
areas covered under an international free trade agree-
ment. For Canada in particular, the agreement provided 
a notable precedent of the involvement of sub-national 
governments in international negotiations—one which 
                                                          
4 A detailed overview of the scope of issues and debates over 
specific sectoral areas is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
more detail see Woolcock (2011). 
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not only created a visible role for provincial interests, 
but also helped clarify the barriers between provinces 
that could impede commerce (Finbow, 2013, p. 3). 
3. Federal Theories, in Brief 
The study of federalism has a long scholarly history, 
and studies usually involve (but are not limited to) the 
case studies of the U.S., Canada, Switzerland, and 
Germany. Definitions concerning what constitutes a 
federal polity are often qualified in different ways by 
different authors, but a general commonality is usually 
the central idea of a combination of self-rule and 
shared rule (Elazar, 1984); basically, a form of govern-
ance that balances authority between a central entity 
and distinct, self-contained entities. How distinct the 
self-contained entities are—whether described as re-
gions, provinces, states, or simply relatively autonomous 
units—is the area of debate within federalist theory. 
Narrower definitions consider regions to be ‘independ-
ent’ within a federal system: “the method of dividing 
powers so that the general and regional governments 
are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent” 
(Wheare, 1963, p. 10). The emphasis on independence, 
however, could potentially connote a lack of accounta-
bility to the federal level, as well as the idea of ad hoc 
cooperation rather than regular and formal coordina-
tion between regions, which might obscure the 
visibility and authority of the central government. 
Broader definitions such as William Riker’s contextual-
ize the independence of the region as ‘autonomous’ to 
account for the cooperation, coordination and collabo-
ration between federal and local levels: “A Constitution 
is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same 
land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of 
action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some 
guarantee (even though merely a statement in the 
constitution) of the autonomy of each government in 
its own sphere” (Riker, 1964, p. 11). 
On the surface, the applicability of the term federal 
to both Canada and the EU seems straightforward. 
Canada offers a seminal example of a decentralized 
federal polity, with a balance of federal political au-
thority that covers an entire country and provincial 
authority that is autonomous within its own policy do-
mains. The EU offers an international example of 
integration of some areas of competency to the supra-
national level, formed by institutions whose sole 
purpose is to govern those policy areas delegated to 
the supranational level, while the domestic level re-
tains authority on numerous areas of decision-making. 
Parallel to other federations (most notably the U.S.), 
the EU began as a group of distinct parts, whose peo-
ple became citizens of the union only through their 
political attachment to their constituent parts—a com-
parison that Fabbrini refers to as the political genus 
“compound democracies” (Fabbrini, 2007, p. 3). The 
critical distinction, of course, is in the idea of state-
hood. Historically, federalism has been associated with 
state-building and integrating diverse units into na-
tionhood (Burgess, 2012, p. 26). Canada is a single 
country with federalism as the trait, and an overarch-
ing ‘federal’ government. The EU, by contrast, is not a 
single state, and the institutions that comprise the su-
pranational level operate according to what amounts 
to intergovernmental treaties (Moravcsik, 2007). This 
viewpoint holds that the areas of policy-making pro-
scribed to the European Commission are limited and 
are at times subject to intergovernmental veto, while 
the treaties do not replace the use of a formal, conven-
tional constitution; as well, at the public level, the 
absence of an intuitive idea of European citizenship all 
heavily limit the depth of European integration. Put 
roughly, the invention of European supranational insti-
tutions has not created a ‘supranation’. 
Nations and nationalism aside, however, the EU has 
many characteristics that lead scholars to comfortably 
group it within comparative federal polities. The major 
EU institutions comprise an integrated system of gov-
ernance, both the motto and the practice of ‘unity in 
diversity’, and a genuine political order of structured 
power. The federal principle is there, if not the conven-
tional federal state (Elazar, 1984; Haas, 1958). The 
absence of nationhood as described by Friedrich (“a 
multicentred authority, democratically legitimized and 
pluralistically accepting the basic fact that each citizen 
belongs to two communities, that of his state and that 
of the nation at large”) (Friedrich, 1962, p. 510), or the 
aversion to applying the term federal to the EU (as 
perhaps best exemplified by the membership of the 
UK), becomes simply politics, rather than institutional 
fact. When analyzed according to behaviour in specific 
political situations rather than according to abstract 
typologies, the EU often conforms strongly to typically 
federal principles, as the case of CETA negotiations 
demonstrates. The distinction is significant for evolving 
paradigms of shared rule in the globalized 21st century. 
4. Canadian Federalism in CETA 
While Canada has a relatively decentralized form of 
federation, the regulation of trade and commerce, and 
thus international trade agreements, are the sole juris-
diction of the Canadian federal government as 
protected by the Canadian Constitution. Although the 
individual provinces can and do maintain their own 
general foreign relations independently of the federal 
government—Quebec and France, for example, or On-
tario’s numerous delegations to other countries—the 
federal standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade is the key decision-making and 
legislative body with the mandate on matters relating 
to international agreements and international trade 
(Senate of Canada, 2011). 
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The style of Canadian federalism “works in the tra-
ditions of both federation and intergovernmental 
relations” (Baier, 2005, p. 206). The federal govern-
ment maintains sole authority in trade and commerce 
and numerous other areas, and everything not specifi-
cally stated as belonging to the provincial levels of 
authority in the Constitution comes under the national 
Parliament (Forsey, 2012). For trade and commerce, 
however, the negotiation of international agreements 
that are increasingly more comprehensive and targeted 
toward regulations and other non-tariff barriers, make 
it more likely that commitments—and thus procedure 
of conducting negotiations—will be made in areas of 
either shared federal-provincial jurisdiction, or simply 
provincial jurisdiction. 
“Greater participation by the provinces and territo-
ries makes the negotiation process more complex 
because of the level of coordination involved in de-
veloping the Canadian position. That said, 
cooperation should make it possible to avoid a situa-
tion in which a province or territory is opposed to the 
text of an agreement and would jeopardize the im-
plementation of some of the clauses in the 
agreement. Because European negotiators want a 
CETA with Canada to include government procure-
ment at the provincial, territorial and municipal 
levels and have made it a priority, consultation with 
the various levels of government in Canada is of even 
greater importance.” (House of Commons, 2011)  
From the outset of negotiations, European officials 
demanded the participation of the provinces as a de-
vice of ‘pre-commitment’. This was both a reaction to 
previous failed attempts at agreements due to provin-
cial unwillingness, and a necessity due to the areas of 
provincial jurisdiction proposed under CETA: govern-
ment procurement, public services, labour mobility, 
and harmonization of regulations. The role of provin-
cial jurisdiction in the realm of international trade 
agreements has been ambiguous with regard to consti-
tutional law, and inconsistently applied in trade 
agreements. For the most part, provinces have been 
limited to a consultatitve role, but the intrusion of 
trade agreements into areas of sub-federal authority 
(such as agriculture, alcohol, energy) have given prov-
inces a weightier role in the final implementation of 
trade agreements (Kukucha, 2011, pp. 132-133). Ku-
kucha, writing in 2011, stated that when earlier 
attempts at Canada–EU trade and investment agree-
ments fell through in 2006, the European perception 
was that provinces were to blame, for failing to allow 
Ottawa to allow the EU to make inroads on services 
and procurement. When Jean Charest first began con-
tact with the EU Trade Commissioner in 2007 towards 
re-igniting Canada–EU trade discussion, he was told 
not to bother unless other provinces were on board 
(Kukucha, 2011, pp. 131-132). CETA, then, became be 
the first large-scale trade agreement in Canada to for-
mally include sub-national governments (Finbow, 2013, 
p. 2). The significance of this is both in procedure and 
in internal impact: procedurally, the mode of negotia-
tion with provincial involvement created a precedent 
for intergovernmental federalism in the areas of trade 
and commerce; in terms of impact, sub-national inclu-
sion in negotiations resulted in, if not actual greater 
internal policy coherence, the discussion and identifica-
tion of a need for greater internal policy coherence for 
trade in Canada (Finbow, 2013, p. 3). The Canadian 
market is “fragmented” and “inhibits commitments to 
trading partners” as a result (Finbow, 2013, p. 3). De-
spite provincial regulations that inadvertently create 
barriers to trade, the Supreme Court of Canada has not 
taken an activist role in attending to such barriers as 
obstacles to the goal of a strong Canadian economic 
union. Intergovernmental politicking between provinc-
es and the federal level are the dominant form of 
resolution (or attempts at) for provincial carriers. This 
is in direct contrast to the EU, where the European 
Commission under Jacques Delors pushed aggressively 
to complete the Single Market, and where the Europe-
an Court of Justice (ECJ) played a critical role in forming 
and maintaining the strength of the Single Market: “As 
a result, the Canadian market is much less integrated 
than the EU one, which may seem surprising to Euro-
pean lawyers given that Canada is a fully-fledged 
federal state” (Hinarejos, 2012, p. 538). 
The anticipated ratification and finalization of CET 
holds strong potential to significantly reshape the dy-
namics of Canadian federalism, in terms of a Canadian 
single market. The size and scope of the agreement, 
with all the attendant rationales for pursuing the 
agreement (sizable growth in Canadian exports, diversi-
fication of regional economic interdependence, access 
to EU single market), offer enormous leverage for policy-
makers and civil society alike to undertake large-scale 
procedural changes in order to maximize the benefits, 
and reduce the risks, of what CETA has to offer. Height-
ening the internal coherency and efficiency of the 
Canadian market is critical in this respect. In doing so, 
provinces could voluntarily reduce their autonomy to 
pursue divergent policies and would thus consequently 
bolster the power of the federal government. This would 
be an important departure from the principle of provin-
cial legislative sovereignty that comes as a result of 
globalized liberalization: “With globalization increasingly 
pushing to the international level the governance of is-
sues that were once considered solely domestic—and 
thus in provincial jurisdiction—Canada must be institu-
tionally prepared to take a strong common position and 
ensure commitment at all levels of government to inter-
national agreements. Otherwise, we run the risk of 
losing our ability to interact economically and politically 
at the international level” (Leblond, 2010, p. 78). 
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5. The European Union and CETA 
Trade and economic relationships with external coun-
tries are one of the longest standing policies of the 
European Union. The 1957 Treaty of Rome held that an 
internal customs union required a uniform external tar-
iff and single trade agreements with non-EC members. 
The six EC members at the time delegated authority for 
this policy area to the European institutions, effectively 
enabling the European Commission—responsible for 
agenda-setting and initiating legislation—to speak with 
one voice in international economic negotiations, and 
setting the expectation that enlargement to future 
members would mandate the criterion of pooling sov-
ereignty in the same way (Woll, 2011, p. 42). 
The single EU market was one of the central goals 
of European integration and remains, arguably, the 
EU’s biggest achievement. The assignment of interna-
tional trade agreements to the supranational level 
could thus be seen as unsurprising, given the early ur-
gency for a European Economic Community. The logic 
of European integration sufficed to maintain support 
for a supranational trade policy in the face of overlap 
between domestic issues in the areas of health and the 
environment with international trade policies. Apart 
from the immediate relationship between an internal 
market and a single external trade policy, the relative 
success of delegation from national to EU level is 
noteworthy in the context of comparative federalism, 
not in the least when compared to Canada.  
The rules governing trade policy in the EU are laid 
out in Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU (TFEU) within the 2009 Lisbon Treaty; this treaty 
extended the ordinary legislative procedure to the area 
of trade, and created a Foreign Affairs Council that is 
also responsible for trade (European Commission, 
2015). The European Commission, the executive insti-
tution of EU governance that is responsible for 
representing the interests of Europe as a whole (as op-
posed to the interests of individual member states), is 
responsible for setting the agenda and conducting ne-
gotiations as the sole representative of the EU, after 
receiving authorization from the Council. The Commis-
sion reports regularly to both the Council and the 
European Parliament throughout the course of negoti-
ation (European Commission, 2015). The 
intergovernmental General Affairs Council of Foreign 
Ministers decides on the negotiation objectives on the 
basis of a Commission proposal, and ultimately ap-
proves the results through the ordinary legislative 
procedure.5 When the Foreign Affairs Council attends 
                                                          
5 The Ordinary Legislative Procedure of the EU, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘Community Method’ and previously 
referred to as ‘codecision’, is the style of policy-making 
whereby the Commission submits a proposal to the European 
Parliament (also a supranational institution) and the Council of 
to issues concerning international trade, it is chaired by 
the country holding the rotating presidency. This se-
cures the balance of power between governmental 
levels; the Commission initiates the trade strategy, but 
the member states must approve the strategy. The 
scope of the Commission’s executive power covers not 
just trade in goods, but also trade in services, intellec-
tual property, foreign direct investment, transport, and 
capital movements (European Commission, 2013; 
Woolcock, 2011, p. 27). 
The 1986 Single European Act introduced qualified 
majority voting within the European Council on single 
market policies (as opposed to unanimity voting, which 
was the previously used method for internal market 
legislation) which helped streamline the process to-
ward achieving the single market, as it removed the 
possibility for a single member state to enact veto 
power in moving market integration forward (Dinan, 
2004; European Commission, 2014). Prior to the single 
market, the 1979 ECJ ruling in Cassis de Dijon 
smoothed the way forward for the free movement of 
goods within the internal market. The case introduced 
the principle of ‘mutual recognition’, where if a prod-
uct was available freely for sale in one member state 
then it must be allowed to do so in all member states. 
The principle of supremacy, where EU law ultimately 
trumps national law, protected the notion of mutual 
recognition and prevented member states from enact-
ing egregious protections to restrict the free 
movement of goods (Dinan, 2004). The single internal 
market of the EU reached completion in 1992, with the 
(Maastricht) Treaty on European Union. This allowed 
for the removal of barriers toward the free movement 
of goods, services, people, and capital among all EU 
member states. 
The degree to which member states have control 
over single market and external trade policies relates 
to both the executive authority of the Commission in 
these policy areas and the central idea of subsidiarity 
within the EU project. To the former, the institutional 
component of “autonomy by design” intentionally in-
sulated the Commission from domestic political 
pressures in order to achieve internal trade liberaliza-
tion: “all authors within this literature strand concur 
that the role of the supranational institutions in EU 
trade policy goes beyond pure intergovernmental deci-
sion-making” (Woll, 2011, pp. 43-44). To the latter, an 
essential concept within the current legal framework of 
the EU treaties is the principle of subsidiarity, which 
ensures that decisions should be taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen and that the Union is justified in 
its actions in light of the possibilities available at the 
                                                                                           
the EU (the intergovernmental institution comprised of 
national leaders). A formal process of consultation, revision, 
and either adoption or dismissal proceeds between the three 
institutions (Dinan, 2004). 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 90-99 96 
national, regional, or local levels (Dinan, 2004). The le-
gality of this framework strikes an effective balance 
between competency and feedback and helps confirm 
that the interests of member states are driving trade 
policy as a whole: “Delegation is thus accompanied by 
a long list of formal and informal control mechanisms, 
as principal-agent analysis suggests and that many ana-
lysts have confirmed in the context of EU trade policy” 
(Woll, 2011, p. 44). 
The push for a trade agreement with Canada came 
largely from Canadian businesses and policy makers, 
but had strong support in numerous EU members, be-
ginning with the German Council Presidency in the 
latter half of 2007 (Hübner, 2011, p. 1). The main in-
centives for the EU in pursuing CETA had to do with 
access to a major industrialized market, access to ener-
gy and resource markets, enhancing revenue for 
businesses and exporters, and, arguably, using Canada 
as a ‘stepping-stone’ to pursue a similar free trade 
agreement with the much larger U.S. To the last point, 
the ability of the EU to negotiate a comprehensive 
agreement with a developed democracy, with notable 
successes in non-tariff areas (such as services, invest-
ment, and public procurement) represented a 
significant success juxtaposed against the failed WTO 
Doha Round, of which the EU had championed. Any 
specific areas of interest or concern with CETA itself 
came less from the actual member states and more 
from businesses or the European Parliament (EP). Ex-
porters and the private sector were generally 
consistently enthusiastic (Irish Exporters Association, 
2013), and the EP was effective in asserting European 
demands and concerns (Waldie, 2013, on the EP and 
pharmaceutical drugs). While the perceived ease in 
achieving consensus among member states towards 
CETA could be attributed to the amount of leverage the 
EU had in negotiations—the EU being the greater mar-
ket, and with less existing reliance on trade with 
Canada—it can also be argued that the institutional de-
sign of the single market and external trade policies 
contributed to the overall lack of objection, disunity, or 
suspicion toward the construction of CETA. One im-
portant exception to this was the Czech Republic’s 
concern over the visa requirement toward Czech citi-
zens traveling to Canada; the visa requirement was 
removed during the final round of CETA talks in late 
2013 (Wingrove, 2013). Aside from this, the process of 
CETA negotiations remained remarkably less conten-
tious in the EU than in Canada. 
6. Comparative Federalism or Comparative 
Intergovernmentalism? 
What do the CETA negotiations to date tell us about 
regional integration, and about federalism as a trait or 
a process? To begin with, regional integration is in-
creasingly becoming a rational method of responding 
to the challenges of globalization, as evidenced through 
economic trade blocs and partnerships (Van Langenhove 
& Scaramagli, 2012). In the case of CETA, regional inte-
gration can be understood in three ways: the single 
market of the EU as European regional integration; the 
commitment to transatlantic interdependence in CETA 
itself; and, the potential for deeper inter-provincial in-
tegration within the Canadian market as a means of 
responding to CETA. The latter dynamic is arguably the 
most significant in terms of the visibility of what the EU 
can accomplish through norms as well as through ma-
terial resources. The strength of the EU single market 
gave it an enormous amount of leverage in CETA dy-
namics. The institutional model supporting the EU’s 
single market—that of clearly delegated authority to 
centralized governance, and an internal market that 
has already effectively removed barriers between EU 
members for trade, services, and investment—became 
increasingly relevant as the EU Commission was able to 
secure the ‘pre-commitment’ of the Canadian provinc-
es before beginning negotiations. In effect, the 
supranational example became the dominant example 
of how separate markets ought to deal with one an-
other. 
In the limited realm of external free trade policies, 
the EU is a stronger example of procedural federalism 
than Canada, if federalism is partly understood by in-
ternal coherency within the framework of ‘unity in 
diversity’. The lack of the federal-nation trait in the EU 
is, in this policy realm, compensated for by the inten-
tionality of European integration. The strict parameters 
of the Ordinary Legislative Method, the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, the central goal of the 
single market, and the strong legal activism of the ECJ 
all combine to make the single economic union less 
fragmented in the EU than in Canada, and as a result, 
the process of negotiating free trade agreements less 
problematic than in Canada. Provincial barriers be-
tween the full free movement of goods, services, 
labour and capital are such that the EU’s single market 
has more fluidity than the Canadian market, which in 
turn has helped the supranational level become the 
logical area of delegation for external trade decisions. 
While the corresponding Canadian procedure for trade 
negotiations is similar at the federal level, the internal 
dynamics between provincial and federal governments 
is less explicit. This is the result of a more fragmented 
internal market and less intrusion into provincial pro-
tectionism by the court system. 
However, the difference between internal regula-
tions of economic unions does not alone define the 
quality of federalism. Canada remains a definitive fed-
eral polity, heavily decentralized and with a strong 
federal level. Its provinces are not sovereign nation-
states, and the federal idea is concretely imbued into 
Canadian politics, governance, and discourse. By con-
trast, the executive authority of the European 
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Commission is not a federal government, and the re-
gions firmly remain sovereign, independent countries. 
The EU offers numerous examples of federal traits, but 
because it is not a nation it lacks the normative com-
mitment to social solidarity typically found in federal 
nations (Hueglin, 2013, p. 191). The distinction pre-
sents an interesting paradox when considering CETA; 
the cautious integration of sovereign nations within the 
EU has resulted in intentional pooling of authority at 
the supranational level for reasons secondary to the 
single market, while the birth of a Canadian federal do-
minion under the 1867 British North America 
Act/Constitution Act established the nation before more 
recent conceptions of inter-provincial policy autonomy. 
The more explicit principle of subsidiarity in the EU, 
combined with qualified majority voting in single market 
policy, has set a structured course for free trade agree-
ments—one that is likely to be mimicked elsewhere. 
The better point might be the idea of comparative 
intergovernmentalism. Instead of the debates over what 
reasonably constitutes an entity to be considered in the 
comparative federal context, a complementary route is 
to compare the two blocs on the basis of their internal 
institutional dynamics. Precisely because of its suprana-
tional ‘non-state’ character, the EU is in many ways 
better institutionally equipped to introduce new agree-
ments or arrangements that attend to the multilateral 
nature of economic globalization (i.e., subsidiarity, or-
dinary legislative procedure, qualified majority voting). 
Procedure and agenda-setting is the direct result of 
improving upon the logic of integration in a manner 
that assuages national interests. Canada, by contrast, is 
clunkier in this regard, but only insomuch as the com-
parison is with free trade negotiations. CETA offered 
the first precedent of sub-national governments being 
included, and with it came inter-provincial debate over 
the stipulations of CETA. The balance between decen-
tralization and the federal government in Canada has 
strong parallels with the ordinary legislative procedure 
in the EU: “power allocations in Canada and the EU are 
not so far apart at all once the conceptual framework 
of federalism with its presumption of watertight divi-
sions of powers is replaced by one emphasizing power 
sharing through intergovernmental cooperation and 
agreements.” (Hueglin, 2013, p. 193) The idea of inter-
governmentalism, with its connotations of cooperation 
through mutual deliberation, offers a better compara-
tive platform for the EU and Canada than broad or 
narrow dimensions of federalism. 
7. Conclusion 
The first conclusion is that the CETA represents a wa-
tershed in international trade agreements for three 
reasons: for the breadth and width of areas subject to 
barrier removal and deregulation; for the precedent 
set in transatlantic cooperation; and for the dynamics 
of policy-making between two very different federal-
style political entities. Traditionally, analyses of federal 
governance have held Canada to be emblematic of a 
federal state and the EU to be a heavily qualified outlier. 
Narrowing the focus on international trade negotiations 
shows that the balance between self-rule and shared-
rule and the division of powers between centre and re-
gions is a less problematic process in the EU due to the 
deliberate internal coherency of the single market. In 
Canada, the inclusion of sub-national governments in 
the free trade negotiation process from the outset 
worked against past procedure and required restructur-
ing of policy-making. Considering the two entities as two 
forms of intergovernmentalist polities—rather than two 
diverse examples of federalism—gives more nuance to 
comparing the institutional properties of both areas. 
There are two important caveats to this argument. 
The first caveat is the imbalance of leverage between 
Canada and the EU; for Canada, CETA offers many 
more benefits and access to the huge European mar-
ket, while for the EU the benefits are to a smaller 
degree. Whether the same degree of smooth delega-
tion and cooperation between EU member states will 
continue in ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) discussions with the U.S.—
whose market size parallels the EU, and thus whose ac-
cess offers exponentially more possibilities and 
controversies—remains to be seen. The second caveat 
is the recognition that civil society and the private sec-
tor may have just as much sway over free trade 
negotiations in either area than provincial governments 
or member states. The role of business chambers and 
employer associations on either side of the Atlantic has 
undoubtedly played a major role in pushing for trade 
liberalization and/or special considerations for specific 
sectors—a factor that should be accounted for so as not 
to over-attribute the dynamics between regional and 
centre governmental institutions.  
The second conclusion is the implication resulting 
from the comparison of CETA negotiations in Canada 
and the EU; namely, the principle of subsidiarity in the 
EU setting, and the success of EU in exporting this prin-
ciple to the federal decision-making system in Canada. 
At the outset of CETA discussions, the Commission as-
serted that Canadian provinces would have to be 
consulted throughout the process in order for the EU 
to begin proceedings. The compliance of the Canadian 
government in this new precedent in part highlights 
the ability of the EU to export European-style federal 
norms to other places. In this regard, the federal char-
acter of the EU might hold more relevance for the 
present context of economic globalization than for past 
theories of federalism. 
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